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 Abstract 
 
  Studies of industrial safety regulations, Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in particular, often find little effect on worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach 
argue that safety standards have little to do with industrial injuries, and defenders of the 
regulatory approach cite infrequent inspections and low penalties for violating safety standards. 
We use recently assembled data from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
concerning underground coal mine production, safety regulatory activities, and workplace 
injuries to shed new light on the regulatory approach to workplace safety. Because all 
underground coal mines are inspected at least once per quarter, MSHA regulations will not be 
ineffective because of infrequent inspections. We estimate over 200 different specifications of 
dynamic mine safety production functions, including ones using deliberately upward biased 
estimators, and cherry pick the most favorable mine safety effect estimates. Although most 
estimates are of insignificant MSHA effects, we select the single regression specification 
producing the most favorable MSHA impact from the agency viewpoint, which we then use in a 
policy evaluation. We address the question of whether it would be cost-effective to move some 
of MSHA’s enforcement budget into alternative programs that could also improve the health of 
the typical miner. Even using cherry picked results most favorable to the agency, MSHA is not 
cost effective at its current levels. Even though MSHA is a small program when judged against 
others like OSHA and EPA, MSHA’s targeted public health objective could be much better 
served (almost 700,000 life years gained on balance for typical miners) if a quarter of MSHA’s 
enforcement budget were reallocated to other programs such as more heart disease screening or 
defibrillators at worksites. 
 1. Introduction 
 There is much evidence that OSHA inspections have not been effective in reducing injuries 
(Kniesner and Leeth 1995: Chapters 1 and 2). One explanation is that there are too few OSHA 
safety inspections to make a difference to firms. OSHA inspections also might not matter much 
to worker safety because of low fines or irrelevant safety regulations. In contrast to the relatively 
infrequent OSHA inspections in construction or manufacturing, mines regulated by the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) are inspected quarterly. Also in contrast to OSHA 
inspections, mine safety inspectors can effect a work stoppage until a safety violation is 
corrected. We use recently assembled data on underground coal mine production, injuries, and 
safety inspection and other regulatory activity to examine econometrically the effectiveness of 
the regulatory approach to workplace safety where the law is potent and inspections frequent. 
We find that even if we cherry-pick results to maximize the estimated effectiveness of MSHA 
there is an excess of inspections in mining, which has a notable cost of foregone opportunities to 
improve the typical miner’s health through other existing means. 
  By way of background, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as it is 
formally called, was the most comprehensive and stringent Federal legislation covering the 
mining industry. It included surface as well as underground coal mines, required two annual 
inspections of every surface coal mine and four at every underground coal mine, and greatly 
increased federal enforcement powers in coal mines. The Coal Act required monetary penalties 
for all violations and established criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations. The 
safety standards for all coal mines were strengthened and health standards adopted. The Coal Act 
included specific procedures for developing improved mandatory health and safety standards and 
established compensation for miners who were totally and permanently disabled by the 
progressive respiratory disease know as black lung. At $110 million, MSHA’s annual 
enforcement budget for coal is about half the size of OSHA’s total budget for all federal and 
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state enforcement efforts. However, in 2000 there were 1,253 establishments and 71,000 workers 
in coal mining versus over 1 million establishments and 23 million workers in manufacturing and 
construction alone. Therefore, on a per establishment basis, MSHA’s enforcement budget is over 
400 times larger and on a per worker basis over 150 times larger than OSHA’s. (For more details 
see http://www.msha.gov).  
  A focal point of our research is to estimate an econometrically sophisticated regression 
model of the connection between mine inspections and mine safety outcomes. We adopt the 
general dynamic panel model of Arellano and Bond (1991), which incorporates sluggish 
adjustment between desired safety outcomes along with endogeneity of both production and 
safety policy at the mine level. We purposely examine a large number (200+) of econometric 
specifications, including ones deliberately biased upwards, so as to find maximal MSHA effects. 
  The dynamic quarterly unbalanced panel model we estimate is in sharp contrast to the 
empirical specifications in the existing literature. Previous work examines aggregate trends in 
injuries without covariates directly related to MSHA activities and attributes success to MSHA if 
a downward trend in coal mine injuries continued or accelerated after MSHA (Lewis-Beck and 
Alford 1980; Weeks 1995), or infers a positive effect of MSHA on mine safety if injuries are 
lower in the post-MSHA period without any consideration of the pre-MSHA pattern of injuries 
(Neumann and Nelson 1982; Fuess and Loewenstein 1990).1 Our research is distinctive not only 
because we allow for a general background trend in mine injuries but also because we do not 
simply attribute unexplained changes in injuries to mine safety regulation as we have direct 
measures of safety regulation enforcement. 
  To summarize our results, we focus on estimates of the exogenous general deterrence 
effects of MSHA, which capture regulatory activities for the mine’s enforcement district. In only 
1/200 specifications are the estimated MSHA effects on injuries negative and large relative to 
their standard errors. Purposely ignoring the issue that statistical significance is suspect when the 
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data have been mined ex ante (Lovell 1983), we then use the single set of parameter estimates 
most favorable to MSHA in a policy evaluation of the agency’s current regulatory activities. 
Even if a modest amount of MSHA’s relatively small enforcement budget, say 25 percent, were 
reallocated to other public health programs targeted to the demographic groups that are typically 
miners, there would be a substantial gain in health status of the target population (about 700,000 
additional life years). 
2. Estimates Needed to Calculate Cost-Effectiveness 
  We begin by describing the information needed to examine the cost-effectiveness of mine 
safety policy. We first answer the focal question of our research. What do we need to do 
econometrically with our newly constructed data set on underground coal mines to estimate the 
response parameters required for evaluating the workplace safety effects of MSHA? 
2.1 Effectiveness 
  Effective safety inspections can reduce deaths and injuries simultaneously. If totinj is the 
total number of injuries (fatal and non-fatal) then the algebraic expression for the economic 
benefit (B) of reducing one workplace (mining) injury is the economic value of d(totinj) = −1, 
which is 
  (1 )f fB VL VIα α= + − .                    (2.1) 
In Equation (2.1) VL is the revealed value of life, VI is the revealed value of avoiding injury, and 
fα  and (1 )fα−  are the proportions of injuries involving fatal versus non-fatal injuries in coal 
mining. The value of injury reduction is a weighted combination of the values placed on 
avoiding fatal and non-fatal injuries. 
2.2 Costs 
  If MSHA inspections neither ignore dangerous conditions nor concoct ones that do not 
exist, then the only way for MSHA to improve safety in underground coal mines is to increase 
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the number of inspections.2 The additional inspections would then result in more withdrawal 
orders or more monetary penalties per mine, thereby raising the expected cost of violating safety 
standards. Let wonum be the number of inspections per mine per quarter with at least one so-
called withdrawal order (the mine must remove workers from the mine) because of a serious 
safety or health violation. Next, let pennum be the number of inspections per mine per quarter 
with at least one monetary fine for a serious safety or health violation.  
  If I is the number of inspections per mine, then the maximum safety impact of additional 
inspections through additional withdrawal orders and monetary penalties is 
 ( ) totinj wonum totinj pennumd totinj dI dI
wonum I pennum I
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .                (2.2) 
In the case where the proportions of withdrawal order inspections and monetary penalty 
inspections are constants ( )jβ , wwonum Iβ=  and ppennum Iβ= . Substituting yields  
( ) w p
totinj totinjd totinj dI dI
wonum pennum
β β∂ ∂= − −∂ ∂ .                   (2.3) 
Because diminishing returns to inspecting mines may hold in reality, Equation (2.3) produces a 
lower bound to the number of inspections it would take to eliminate one injury, which in turn 
means that calculations based on Equation (2.3) may overstate the cost-effectiveness of MSHA, 
giving the benefit of the doubt to the agency. 
  The most important aspect of our research will be the safety outcomes regressions that 
yield estimates of ( / )totinj wonum∂ ∂  and ( / )totinj pennum∂ ∂ . Once we have regression 
estimates of the two partial derivatives we can set ( ) 1d totinj = −  in (2.3) and solve for dI to 
determine the number of additional MSHA inspections needed to eliminate one workplace 
injury, which is 
  ( ) ( )
1
totinj totinj
w pwonum pennum
dI β β∂ ∂∂ ∂
= + .                   (2.4) 
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  To address the issue of cost effectiveness we can compare the cost of the additional 
inspections computed at the average cost, ( AC dI× ), to the benefits of the additional inspections 
evaluated in Equation (2.1). 
3. Conceptual Framework 
  It is helpful to place into an economic context of the firm the two partial derivatives in  
Equation (2.4) that are the primary components of the cost of MSHA safety enforcement 
activities. The small-scale economic model of the firm we present clarifies how to estimate 
econometrically the effectiveness of MSHA in a way that improves on the existing empirical 
literature concerning the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory approach to enhancing mine safety. 
  Consider a mine in year t with an (endogenous) optimal stock of health and safety capital 
per mine, tq . We denote the workplace injury rate by tIR . Job risk outcomes are related to health 
and safety capital by the function R(•), which is the inverse of the production function for worker 
safety, S(•), such that 
  1( ) ( )t t tIR R q S q
−= = .                     (3.1) 
In the typical situation, safety capital is productive and regulation not counterproductive to the 
workplace safety environment ( 0R′ ≤  and / 0t tq m∂ ∂ ≥ , with m a vector of MSHA activities) so 
that ( ( ))t tIR R q m=  and / 0t tIR m∂ ∂ ≤ .3 
  In the econometric specification of the inverse safety production function that we 
estimate we acknowledge that the impact of MSHA enforcement involves multiple activities, 
each of which can have non-linear effects described by the reverse S-shape depicted in Figure 1. 
In particular, we will allow the starting level of MSHA enforcement to condition its marginal 
effectiveness, such that more enforcement may be ineffective when starting from either very low 
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or very high initial levels. The shape in Figure 1 also implies that reducing MSHA somewhat 
from very high initial levels can be cost-effective. 
  Before we describe the econometric model and the resulting parameter estimates there are 
a few more conceptual details to flesh out in Equation (3.1). First, safety capital wears out, as 
does all capital, so that 1( ) ( (1 ) )t t tR q R q qδ −= ∆ + − , where ∆ indicates investment and δ is the 
depreciation rate. It will also typically be the case that the function R(•) will be conditioned by 
the characteristics of workers and the technology contributing to injuries, such as worker safety 
training or scale of output (Viscusi 1992). Using tZ  to represent the other econometrically 
includable conditioning factors, the inverse safety production function is 
  1 1( , | )t t t tIR R IR m Z− −= .                    (3.2) 
   The optimal amount of safety capital, q, at time t depends on its previous level and the 
firm’s desired investment in safety capital, both of which depend on previous injury levels and 
mine safety regulation enforcement, 1tIR −  and 1tm − . It is convenient to think of the previous 
injury rate, 1tIR − , as reflecting empirically the previous period’s stock of safety and health 
capital, 1tq − . It will then be the case that 1/ 0t tIR m −∂ ∂ ≤  if (after allowing for threshold effects 
depicted in Figure 1) MSHA has its intended effects on workplace activities. Because we do not 
have direct observations on investment in safety capital, tq∆ , the estimated effect of MSHA will 
reflect both the direct regulatory effect on safety plus any indirect effect through the agency’s 
impact on health and safety investments not reflected in tZ  (Viscusi 1992).
4 
4. Econometric Background 
  The theoretical discussion of the last section emphasized the need for control covariates 
and dynamic adjustment to the ultimate equilibrium safety level. This leads naturally to the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model that is summarized in general algebraic form as 
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  1 2
1
p
it it j j it it i it
j
y y x wα β β υ ε−
=
= + + + +∑  1,..., ;i N=  1,..., ,it T=          (4.1) 
where jα  are p parameters to be estimated, itx  is a 1 × k1 vector of strictly exogenous covariates, 
1β  is a 1 × k1 vector of parameters to be estimated, itw  is a 1 × k2 vector of predetermined 
covariates,  and 2β  is a 1 × k2 vector of parameters to be estimated.5 The iυ  are random effects 
that are independent and identically distributed (iid) over mines with variance 2υσ , and the 
overall errors, itε , are iid over the whole sample with variance 2εσ  and covariance 0υεσ =  for 
each mine over all time periods. When estimating the inverse safety production function of 
Equation (3.2) with the Arellano-Bond estimator of Equation (4.1) the dependent variable is a 
mine’s total injuries; the predetermined variables include production levels and mine-specific 
MSHA enforcement activities, and exogenous variables include mine district MSHA 
enforcement activities plus mine district and time dummies.  
  The Arellano-Bond estimator proceeds by first differencing Equation (4.1), which 
removes iυ  and leaves the equation estimable by instrumental variables. Arellano and Bond 
derived a GMM estimator for jα  (j ∈ {1, …, p}), β1, and β2 using as instruments the lagged 
levels of the dependent variable and predetermined variables and differences of the strictly 
exogenous variables.6 
  A practical problem with the Arellano-Bond estimator is that predetermined variables 
greatly increase the size of the instrument matrix. A very large instrument matrix makes GMM 
estimators perform poorly in small samples or makes the model inestimable.7 
  It also is important to note that there are two versions of the Arellano-Bond estimator, a 
one-step estimator and a two-step estimator, which adds additional complexity for the applied 
researcher. In the one-step estimator, the Sargan test over-rejects the overidentifying restrictions 
when there is heteroskedasticity. However, the standard errors of the two-step estimator are 
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biased downward in small samples. So, the researcher generally uses both the one-step and two-
step Arellano-Bond estimators, but for different purposes. The two-step results are better for 
model specification testing of the over-identifying restrictions, and the one-step results are better 
for inferences on the regression coefficients. Finally, it is important to note that the dynamic 
model in Equation (4.1) is not identified if the dependent variable is persistent (a pure random 
walk makes lagged levels of y weak instruments, and weak instruments lead to finite sample bias 
in panel instrumental variables models), so one should also test for a unit root in yt before 
estimating Equation (4.1) (Bond 2002).8 
5. Data 
  To generate our data for estimation we merge five separate data sets provided by the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration covering inspections, violations, assessed penalties, 
injuries, and production and employment. The five data sets provide unique tracking numbers for 
each inspection, violation, and mine. Using the violations and inspections tracking numbers we 
link the information on assessed penalties and violations to information on inspections. We then 
combine enforcement information and quarterly data on production and employment based on 
mine identification numbers and beginning dates of the inspections. Likewise, we tie injury 
information to each mine and each quarter based on the date of injury and mine identification 
number.9 The merged data set we use in estimation contains quarterly information on MSHA 
enforcement efforts and mining injuries, employment, and production from 1983 to 1997. 
  Although MSHA enforcement efforts may have an immediate effect on the frequency or 
severity of accidents, they are unlikely to change the immediate incidence of health-related 
problems such as hearing loss or black-lung disease. Mine-related diseases develop gradually so 
that it is unlikely we can adequately determine the effect of MSHA enforcement efforts on miner 
health using information spanning the 15 years available. Accordingly, we exclude from the 
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original data set all inspections focusing on health (such as inspections of a mine’s ventilation 
system or monitoring for dust, noise or silica). To narrow our focus further to inspections likely 
to improve miner safety directly, we also exclude all MSHA actions not on mine property, 
activities related to education and training, investigations for discrimination, and audits of 
accident, injury, illness, and employment records. In every case where we exclude an inspection 
or MSHA activity we likewise exclude the resulting citations, orders, and penalties. 
  Figures 2 through 4 depict the history of mine safety, including the quarterly data in our 
estimation sample. What the annual data in Figure 2 show is that MSHA, as it post-dates the 
1969 Coal Act, may have had its intended effect of improving safety, at least where fatal injuries 
are concerned. Figure 3 also reveals the possibility that non-fatal injuries too may be affected by 
MSHA, most recently since the mid-1980s. Finally, Figure 4, which plots the quarterly data in 
our estimation sample of 1983 to 1997, emphasizes the seasonality of injuries as well as supports 
the possibility that MSHA has been effective in reducing miner injuries since the middle 1980s. 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics on MSHA safety-related enforcement activities 
directed at coal mines operating from 1983 to 1997.10 All monetary figures have been adjusted to 
reflect inflation to 2002. The first two panels provide information on individual citations and 
orders to withdraw miners from the worksite, the third panel reports MSHA penalties per 
inspection, and the last two panels provide total enforcement efforts per quarter. 
  Panels A and B of Table 1 reveal that most, but not all, MSHA penalties were imposed 
for serious violations of health and safety standards. About 60 percent of citations and 57 percent 
of withdrawal orders were issued for violations that MSHA inspectors viewed as significant and 
substantial, or likely to result in injury. 
  With an average of $184, initial fines on citations were fairly small. Fines on withdrawal 
orders were considerably larger, averaging $2,079, although only 60 percent of withdrawal 
orders imposed a separate monetary penalty.11 MSHA adjusted initial penalties downward over 
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time. Monetary penalties on withdrawal orders fell from their initial amounts an average of 39 
percent, and monetary penalties on citations fell from their initial amounts an average of about 
14 percent. 
  The degree of operator negligence may at least partially explain the much larger average 
fine on withdrawal orders than on citations. Approximately 88 percent of the violations resulting 
in a withdrawal order were classified by MSHA inspectors as caused by a high degree of 
operator negligence or reckless disregard of miner safety, whereas only about 2 percent of the 
violations resulting in the issuance of a citation were caused by a high degree of operator 
negligence or reckless disregard of miner safety. 
  Besides a monetary penalty, withdrawal orders also shut down production, which 
imposes a potentially large cost if operations are disrupted for an extended period. At least 50 
percent of the withdrawal orders were terminated fairly quickly, in one day or less, but for a 
sizable number the days from issuance to termination extended for weeks and, in some cases, 
months and years. Because of the extremes, the average number of days from issuance to 
termination is large, 32.2 days. Appendix A provides additional details of the distribution of lost 
days. As shown, 25 percent of all withdrawal orders from 1983 to 1997 extended for six days or 
more, and 5 percent extended for 112 days or more. With such a potentially long shut down 
period, mines had strong incentives to avoid conditions likely to result in withdrawal orders. 
Additionally, the harsh penalties shown in Appendix A for failure to abate and imminent danger 
hazards likely motivated mines to rectify previously discovered problems and avoid conditions 
liable to result in death or severe injury. By way of contrast, the incentives to avoid citations 
resulting only in monetary penalties were quite small. From 1983 to 1997, 95 percent of all 
citations had initial fines less than $447, and 99 percent had initial fines less than $1,158. By 
law, mines must continue to pay miners for the remainder of the shift during which a withdrawal 
order is issued and for up to four hours the next day if the withdrawal order is still in effect, 
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meaning that the monetary losses from a withdrawal order almost always substantially exceed 
the losses from a simple citation resulting in a fine. 
  As can be seen in Panel C of Table 1, about 40 percent of MSHA safety inspections led 
to a monetary penalty, and about 5 percent of inspections resulted in a withdrawal order. About 
31 percent of all inspections uncovered at least one serious violation of MSHA health and safety 
standards, and about 5 percent of inspections discovered at least one violation with a high degree 
of operator negligence. For inspections where a monetary penalty was imposed, the initial fines 
for all citations and withdrawal orders issued during the inspection averaged $1,503. Over time, 
the monetary penalties fell by about 14 percent on average.  
  Panel D of Table 1 presents MSHA enforcement efforts per quarter. Although by law 
every underground coal mine must be inspected at least once per quarter, mines liberating a high 
amount of methane or other explosive gases are inspected much more frequently, every 5, 10, or 
15 days depending on the amount of gas emitted. Additionally, there are spot inspections of 
electrical systems, roof supports, shafts, slopes, and major construction and investigations 
generated by accidents or written requests. From 1983 to 1997, the average operating coal mine 
was inspected for safety-related problems four to five times per quarter but had slightly less than 
two inspections per quarter resulting in monetary penalties and 0.211 inspections per quarter 
resulting in withdrawal orders. Per inspection with fines, the average monetary penalty for all 
violations was $1,263. On average, MSHA reduced monetary penalties by about 16 percent from 
initial levels.  
  Finally, Panel E of Table 1 indicates quarterly enforcement efforts with all minor 
violations excluded, which are violations that MSHA inspectors believe are unlikely to result in 
injury. MSHA can improve miner safety only to the extent that inspectors can identify serious 
violations of safety standards, violations likely to result in injury. MSHA discovered serious 
violations of safety standards in a large majority of mines each quarter. Slightly more than 71 
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percent of all mines received at least one monetary penalty for a serious violation of safety 
standards. Per quarter, the average operating coal mine had about 1.4 inspections resulting in 
monetary penalties for serious violations, 0.11 inspections resulting in withdrawal orders, and 
0.18 inspections with one or more high degree of operator negligence violations. The average 
fine per inspection with fine was $1,442 initially, but over time, imposed penalties fell by about 
17 percent.  
6. Econometric Results 
  We now describe the large number of specifications of a dynamic mine safety equation 
that we estimated. In contrast to Sala-I-Martin (1997) who examines several million regressions 
to find the true model of country growth, we search among a large number of regressions to find 
the single set of results most favorable to MSHA. We then use our shamelessly data mined 
results in best-case calculations of the cost effectiveness of MSHA and its implications for 
improving the health and safety of the population typically working as miners. 
  Our research also is similar to a meta-analysis on one data set because, in the process of 
estimating a large number of econometric specifications, we will, as a by-product, see if a pattern 
emerges with regards to the effectiveness of MSHA in influencing miner safety. The large 
number of regression specifications (200+) comes about because we consider various (1) safety 
measures (total injuries, injury rate, fatal injuries, non-fatal injuries, zero versus some injuries), 
(2) MSHA activities (specific abatement, general deterrence, both), (3) instrument sets (small, 
medium, large), (4) time frames (quarterly, annual), (5) distributed lag structures (1, 4, and 8 
quarters), (6) output measures (production, labor hours), (7) degrees of non-linearity in MSHA 
effects (linearity, cubic, orthogonal polynomials), (8) time effects (yes, no), (9) location effects 
(yes, no), (10) non-exogeneity of MSHA’s mine-specific abatement activities (yes, no), and (11) 
estimation techniques (GMM, OLS, Tobit, Heckit, count models). The conclusion emerging is 
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that the results in the overwhelming number of cases are unfavorable to the safety enhancement 
objective of MSHA at current levels of regulation. 
6.1 Key Regression Variables 
  Table 2 presents definitions of the regression variables. In using the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel model (4.1) on our quarterly mining data the focal dependent variable is totinjit, 
which is the number of workers in quarter t at mine i that have a lost-workday injury, including 
death. Exogenous variables include quarterly time dummies and mine district location dummies, 
which are described in Appendix B. Always treated as predetermined is our primary measure of 
mining activity, the log of total employee hours worked, lhourit. 
  We consider three specifications for MSHA activities: models with general (mine-district 
level) deterrence measures, models with specific (to the mine itself) deterrence measures, and 
models with both general and specific deterrence measures. Here the vector m(general)it ≡ 
[lindamtit, pennumit, wonumit], where lindamt is the log of the mine’s enforcement district 
average monetary penalty per inspection with monetary penalty (calculated excluding mine i), 
pennum is the mine’s enforcement district’s inspections per mine with monetary penalty 
(excluding mine i), and wonum is the mine’s enforcement district’s inspections per mine with 
withdrawal order (excluding mine i). The vector m(specific)it ≡ [posnumit, sumwoit], where 
posnum is the mine’s number of inspections with monetary penalties, and sumwo is the mine’s 
number of inspections with withdrawal orders.12 So, when estimating the dynamic panel model 
of mine injuries (4.1) we examine specifications where m(general) is part of x and specifications 
where m(specific) is part of w and include four lagged values of both y and m on the right-hand 
side for symmetry in dynamic adjustment in y to past shocks and policy changes. 
  To fix ideas, the prototypical model specification we estimate is 
  
4 4 4
1 1 2 2
1 0 0
it it j j it j j it j j it it
j j j
y y x w xα β β γ ε− − −
= = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆∑ ∑ ∑ ,           (6.1) 
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where general deterrence is part of x1, specific deterrence is part of w and time and location 
effects are conditioned out in x2. Although one can consider the dynamic patterns in coal mine 
injuries here, we are generally interested in equilibrium multiplier effects of MSHA, which are 
(
1
kjj
jj
β
α−
∑
∑ ),  k = 1, 2.  
6.2 Focal Regression 
  We could not produce a single regression using mine-specific abatement measures that 
had an estimated negative effect for MSHA, which we attribute to the inability of the 
instrumental variables approach to correct for the endogeneity of MSHA whereby additional 
injuries in a mine trigger additional inspections. Regressions with specific deterrence regressors 
that parallel our focal regression in terms of specification and instrument sets appear in Appendix 
C. For our subsequent cost-effectiveness calculations we selected the only regression from over 
200 that simultaneously satisfied the following criteria: computational feasibility (maximum lag 
length for an instrument is 15 quarters), quarterly data; time and location dummies; four-quarter 
lags on the injury rate, production, and MSHA; at least one negatively signed MSHA coefficient 
that is 1.68 times its standard error; and the estimated equilibrium impact effect of MSHA is also 
negative ( ˆ 0jj β <∑ ).13 
  The only (one-step Arellano and Bond) regression that satisfied the intersection of our 
model selection criteria just described produced the following result, where underline indicates 
that the coefficient was 1.68 times its (robust) standard error: 
∆totinjt  = 0.39∆totinjt-1 + 0.15∆totinjt-2 + 0.06∆totinjt-3 + 0.04∆totinjt-4 
   + 1.10∆lhourt – 0.07∆lhourt-1 – 0.06∆lhourt-2 – 0.04∆lhourt-3 – 0.06∆lhourt-4 
   – 0.01∆lindamt – 0.02∆lindamt-1 – 0.01∆lindamt-2 + 0.03∆lindamt-3 + 0.02∆lindamt-4 
   – 0.04∆penumt – 0.04∆penumt-1 – 0.12∆penumt-2 + 0.04∆penumt-3 + 0.06∆penumt-4 
   – 0.08∆wonumt – 0.73∆wonumt-1 + 0.07∆wonumt-2 + 0.29∆wonumt-3 – 0.45∆wonumt-4 
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   + γ1 time dummies + γ2 location dummies.               (6.2) 
   ηlindam = 0.015, ηpenum = −0.25, ηwonum = −0.16 
   P(No 1st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(No 2nd order serial correlation) = 0.11 
Our focal regression Equation (6.2) yields an equilibrium impact multiplier for lindam that is 
small, positive and statistically insignificant (which we will subsequently ignore in our policy 
simulations), an equilibrium impact multiplier for penum that is –0.31, which implies an 
elasticity at the means of – 0.25, and an equilibrium impact multiplier for wonum that is −2.53, 
which implies an elasticity at the means of – 0.16.14 Interestingly, both of the estimated MSHA 
effects in (6.2) are close to the results in Scholtz and Gray (1990) for the general deterrence 
effects of OSHA. 
7. MSHA Cost-Effectiveness Calculations 
  Before considering the economic and policy implications of our results, we note that 
some might view omitting possible health improvements from MSHA inspection activities as a 
gap in our research. In 1970, the year after passage of the Coal Mine Act, the number of death 
listings with any mention of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) was 2,189; by 
1996 the number of death listings had dropped 35 percent to 1,417 (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 1991, 1999). The incidence of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis fell even 
more dramatically than the number of death listings. During the first round of the NIOSH Coal 
Workers’ X-Ray Surveillance Program (1970 to 1973), 11 percent of miners had some form of 
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. During the sixth round of surveillance (1992 to 1996), 2.8 
percent of miners had some form of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, which is about a 75 percent 
drop from the initial level (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1999). Although 
MSHA may have been a factor in improving miner health, other factors may also have 
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contributed, such as improvements in technology, union efforts, greater worker awareness, and 
even reductions in smoking incidence.  
Attempting to disentangle all the potential influences on miner health would be difficult 
econometrically, to say the least. Even more problematic would be trying to relate health 
improvements to specific inspections given the long lag-time between worker exposure and any 
signs of worker ill health. Our research, therefore, focuses on the impact of MSHA general and 
safety-related inspections on miner safety. We exclude from our empirical work enforcement 
activities not on mine property, including computer generated dust sampling, education and 
training activities, and inspections geared specifically toward health issues. Because general and 
safety-related inspections uncover few health-related problems, changes in the number of the 
inspections we examine should have little impact on miner health.15 
7.1 Baseline Values 
  We now turn our attention to the arithmetic details of safety inspections’ costs and 
benefits. Viscusi (1993) and Viscusi and Aldy (2002) argue that the range of reasonable value-
of-life estimates is from $3 million to $7 million and that the value of a lost workday injury is 
about $50,000 ($1990). The highest reported implicit value of injury in Viscusi (1993) is Biddle 
and Zarkin’s (1988) estimate based on willingness to accept, $131,495. We base our calculations 
of the costs and effectiveness of MSHA on the estimates of the economic losses from fatal and 
non-fatal injuries just mentioned. 
7.2 Benefits 
  From 1983 to 1997 there were 428 fatalities and 91,773 nonfatal lost workday injuries in 
our estimation sample. The proportion of fatal injuries in all injuries was 0.0046, and the 
corresponding proportion of nonfatal lost workday injuries in all injuries was 0.9954. The value 
of reducing one injury established earlier in Equation (2.1) is  
 VIVLB 9954.00046.0 += ,                    (7.1) 
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where VL is the value of a life saved, and VI is the value of an injury prevented. 
  Using the highest value of life and value of injury figures mentioned above so as to make 
the gains from MSHA as large as possible, the benefit of reducing an injury in underground coal 
mines (converted to $2002) is 
 0.0046 9,447,000 0.9954 176,800 $219,443B = × + × = .             (7.2) 
7.3 Costs  
  In Section 6 we located the one of approximately 200 regressions with the largest 
significant estimated effects of wonum and pennum. Based on our cherry picked regression, the 
largest possible injury-reducing effect of inspections leading to a withdrawal order or a monetary 
penalty is then 
 ( ) 2.53 0.306wonum pennumd totinj dI dI
I I
∂ ∂= − −∂ ∂ .
16             (7.3) 
Here,  
M
I
woI
wonum
×
=  and                   (7.4) 
M
I
penI
pennum
×
= .                   (7.5) 
From 1983 to 1997 for the mines in our estimation sample, there were 6,249 inspections 
with at least one withdrawal order for a serious violation, 79,888 inspections with a monetary 
penalty for at least one serious violation, and 252,411 inspections. The fraction of withdrawal 
order inspections in all inspections was 0.0248, and the fraction of monetary penalty inspections 
in all inspections was 0.3165. In the last quarter of 1997, the number of mines that had been 
operating for at least five quarters (the minimum necessary to be in the estimation sample) was 
572. 
  18
Substituting the inspection and mines operating numbers into Equations (7.4) and (7.5) 
and then substituting the derivatives of Equations (7.4) and (7.5) with respect to I into Equation 
(7.3) yields 
0.0248 0.3165( ) 2.55 0.306 0.00011 0.00017
572 572
d totinj dI dI dI dI= − − = − − .       (7.6) 
Setting d(totinj) = −1 and solving for dI, we determine the number of additional 
inspections MSHA would need to eliminate one workplace injury. Using the upper bound 
regression results from Section 6 produces a lower bound for dI = 3,584.  
We have MSHA supplied information on inspector time for 99 percent of the 252,411 
inspections of the underground coal mines in our estimation sample. Time is broken down into 
four categories:  travel, report writing, surface inspections, and mechanized mining unit 
inspections. For the total sample the average and median total inspection times were 29.8 hours 
and eight hours. Excluding the longest 1 percent of inspections by total time, the average and 
median inspection lengths were 24.7 hours and eight hours. 
According to the Position Classification Standard for Mine Safety and Health, GS-1822, 
a starting underground coal mine inspector would have a government service classification of 9. 
In 2001, GS-9, step 1 received an hourly wage of $15.93 
(http://www.opm.gov/oca/01tables/gshrly/html/01gshr.htm).  
Ignoring overhead costs and using the median inspection length, the minimum cost of the 
3,584 additional inspections needed to reduce total coal mine injuries by one would then be (in 
$2002) equal to 3,584 8 $16.17 $463,966× × = . 
7.4 Cost/Benefit 
  What then is the cost-benefit ratio when we ignore the fact that we cherry-picked 
regression results to get the most favorable impact of MSHA and, in turn, use the least possible 
cost of an inspection? The estimated cost of eliminating an injury is $463,966 and the benefit 
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from eliminating an injury is $219,443. The implied cost/benefit ratio for the most favorable case 
we can construct for MSHA is about 2.1 > 1. At current levels safety inspections are not cost-
beneficial. 
7.5 Cost of Reducing One Fatality 
  We might also address the cost-effectiveness issue somewhat differently and focus on 
either reducing fatalities in isolation or on reducing non-fatal injuries in isolation. Because 0.46 
percent of all injuries are fatalities, eliminating fatality would require reducing total injuries by 
1/0.0046 = 217. Because few injuries in mining are fatal, Equation (6.6) indicates that the 
number of additional inspections required to eliminate one miner death would then be 779,155. 
Evaluated at the median time per inspection the cost of eliminating one fatality would be 779,156 
× 8 × $16.18 = $100,865,530. 
  As a reference point for comparison and evaluation, we can consider that regulatory 
allocations involve an opportunity cost as they impose real financial costs on consumers and 
taxpayers because the money spent on regulatory costs would otherwise be spent on other 
bundles of consumer commodities. Based on such risk-risk tradeoff considerations, economists 
have estimated that when government agencies  propose risk reducing regulations that impose a 
cost per life saved at levels of about $69 million or more ($2002), then on balance the regulation 
is harming individual health (Viscusi 1994, 1998). So, it is important to recognize that the 
MSHA cost of saving a life is about 1.5 times the cutoff point for an acceptable life-saving 
regulation from broad social perspective that a policy analyst should use. 
  To put the amount of additional inspections needed to reduce fatalities by one into 
perspective (again ignoring the general lack of statistical significance of MSHA safety 
inspections), in 1997 the total coal enforcement budget for MSHA was $107 million (Budget of 
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999). In 1997 there were 72,390 inspections of coal 
mines.17 The total cost per inspection in 1997 was therefore $1,478, which includes more than 
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just labor cost of the inspector. In $2002, the cost of eliminating one fatality would then be 
779,156 × $1,501 ≅  $1.17 billion, which is over 10 times the annual enforcement budget. Put 
differently, the increase in inspections needed to eliminate one miner death is more than 10 times 
the total number of inspections now conducted by MSHA.  
7.6 Cost of Reducing One Injury 
  To eliminate one non-fatal injury would require an additional 3,601 inspections using 
Equation (7.6). The lower bound estimate of eliminating a non-fatal injury using the median 
inspection time and the average cost per inspection is then 3,601 × 8 × $16.18 = $466,167, which 
is over 2.6 times the estimated benefit of an injury foregone. 
8. Discussion: Policy Implications for Miners’ Health 
  It has frequently been suggested that regulatory programs be subjected to continued OMB 
review for cost and effectiveness (Kniesner and Viscusi 2003 and references therein). We close 
with an example how a cost-effectiveness review could be applied to MSHA because it may help 
to frame the policy implications of our empirical results. It will make things more transparent, 
too, to recast our estimated MSHA effects in terms of life years gained, on balance, if some of 
the MSHA enforcement budget were reallocated to a few identifiable other programs that would 
likely affect the health of miners. 
8.1 Cost Per Life Year Saved by MSHA 
  As we have noted, the proportion of fatal injuries to all injuries is 0.0046, and the 
proportion of nonfatal lost workday injuries to all injuries is 0.9954. Totinj combines both fatal 
and nonfatal lost workday injuries. The number of lost life years saved from reducing one injury 
is then 
 injury) nonfatal  todue yearslost (9954.0 death)  todue yearslost (0046.0 ×+×=B . 
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  The average age of miners killed on the job in the estimation sample is 37.9. Based on 
life expectancy tables posted at the National Center for Health Statistics the remaining life 
expectancy of a 38 year old is 40.7 years. Using a 5 percent real interest rate (as applied in Tengs 
et al. 1995), the discounted number of life years saved from avoiding one mining death is then 
17.3. 
The average days lost from work due to a nonfatal injury in the estimation sample is 
39.17. We calculate average days lost replacing reported days lost with statutory days lost for all 
permanent total or permanent partial disabilities with reported days lost of zero. On average, a 
miner loses 0.107 of a work year from a nonfatal injury. Substituting 17.3 for lost years due to 
death and 0.107 for lost years due to nonfatal injury into the equation above, the number of life 
years saved for every miner injury avoided is 0.186. 
  From previous calculations, the minimum cost of avoiding one injury using government 
inspectors’ salary rates expressed in $2002 is $463,996. Combining results, the least cost per life 
year saved estimate in $2002 is $463,996 ÷ 0.186 = $2,494,602.18  
8.2 Improving Health for the Target Population 
  Our estimates imply that using the most optimistic estimated effects from Section 7, it 
costs about $2,500,000 per life year gained via MSHA enforcement activities. The appropriate 
public policy issue, then, is whether there are cheaper ways to improve the health of the 
population overall or of miners in particular. 
  A rich source of information for our ultimate policy evaluation exercise is Tengs et al. 
(1995), who calculate government cost per life year gained for 500 health enhancing 
interventions. If one takes a transcendental view that a life year is a life year no matter whose it 
is, then there are many programs Tengs et al. discover that have a per life year cost of nearly 
$0.19 Suppose in addition to budget neutrality we add the second consideration that any 
movement of resources out of MSHA’s safety enforcement budget be put into programs likely to 
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affect persons with the demographic characteristics of the typical miner. What net gain in health, 
as measured by life years, could be obtained by moving 25 percent of MSHA’s enforcement 
budget into alternative programs that could benefit the population of miners? The results are 
surprising despite the relatively small budgetary level of MSHA. 
  MSHA is small relative to other well-known regulatory agencies. In recent years, the 
overall budget of OSHA has been 1.7 times the budget of MSHA, and the annual budget of the 
EPA has been 24.6 times the budget of MSHA. Let us just consider now the annual enforcement 
budget of MSHA for coal, which is about $110 million. One-fourth of the MSHA enforcement 
budget is $27.5 million. At a cost of $2,500,000 per life year, a 25 percent reduction in MSHA 
inspections would reduce life years by about 11, which is less than one statistical miner’s life. 
Using the list in Tengs et al. (1995), programs that could affect the health of persons who might 
be in the population of miners would include more heart disease screening or more on-site 
defibrillators, as suggested recently by OMB, which would each produce a life year at a cost of 
$40. So, moving $27.5 million from the MSHA enforcement budget into more heart disease 
screening or defibrillators would gain on balance 687,489 = (687,500 – 11) life years for the 
affected population, which is equivalent to about 16,800 statistical miners’ lives. 
  The point of the exercise is to demonstrate that even a program as small as MSHA can 
have relatively large opportunity costs. We have shown that a modest amount of reallocation of 
program expenditures can make a substantial improvement in the public health of the target 
population. Although there are specific mandates via OSHA and MSHA addressing workplace 
health and safety, funding levels for OSHA and MSHA and their target activities are legislative 
decisions. As policy analysts, we argue for cost-effective government policy in the area of 
promoting health and longevity. Our estimates demonstrate the sizeable potential gain in miners’ 
health from budgetary reallocation to other existing programs. We believe our estimates clearly 
imply a need for government to take a more transcendental view by considering public health 
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more generally and consider more comprehensively the options available to improve the health 
of the working population. 
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Appendix A 
Withdrawal Orders, Days from Issuance to Termination, 1983-1997 
Percentiles 
Violation 
Section 
of Act Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 25th 50th 75th 95th Max Number1 
All  32.2 167.2 0 1 6 112 4,656 36,704 
Failure to abate 104B 59.4 221.5 0 3 25 282 4,633 8,651 
Unwarrantable 
failure to comply 104D1 22.9 121.8 0 1 5 52 3,431 8,186 
Subsequent similar  104D2 15.3 125.8 0 0 2 26 1,777 13,781 
Imminent danger 107A 43.9 202.6 0 1 8 178 4,656 6,086 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
1 Withdrawal orders lacking termination dates are excluded from the calculations.  
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Appendix B: Enforcement Districts 
 
  The enforcement of MSHA standards is divided between the Coal Mine Safety and 
Health and Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health groups. In turn the groups are broken 
down into enforcement districts (11 in coal and six metal and nonmetal) and field offices (65 in 
coal and 50 metal and nonmetal). The 11 coal mining enforcement districts are: 
District 1  Anthracite coal mining regions in Pennsylvania 
District 2  Bituminous coal mining regions in Pennsylvania 
District 3  Maryland, Ohio, and Northern West Virginia 
District 4  Southern West Virginia 
District 5  Virginia 
District 6  Eastern Kentucky 
District 7  Central Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
District 8  Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Northern Missouri, and 
Wisconsin 
District 9 All states west of the Mississippi River, except Minnesota, Iowa, and Northern 
Missouri 
District 10 Western Kentucky 
District 11 Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands 
 
Besides conducting inspections, the regional offices also review mine plans for safety 
concerns. The mine operator devises appropriate engineering plans, and then the engineering 
specialists at MSHA review and approve the proposed plans. Once approved, the mine operator 
must follow the plans. Specific areas include control of mine roof and ventilation system.  
District managers are responsible for supervising inspectors in their districts. MSHA has 
acknowledged that there is inconsistency in how inspectors interpret standards. To help remedy 
the problem, it has established a District Managers Council (DMC) which meets quarterly to 
discuss and try to correct enforcement inconsistencies. 
The Office of Assessments determines the size of monetary penalties. The criteria for 
penalties include the size of the business, the seriousness of the violation, and the degree of the 
mine operator’s negligence. When a major accident is reported, the district manager dispatches 
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MSHA personnel to the site. The mine operator has control and responsibility for rescue efforts 
but must seek approval from MSHA for actions taken. 
In a report by the Office of the Inspector General on metal/nonmetal mining enforcement 
and compliance assistance activities, it was recommended that MSHA should improve guidance 
to district offices regarding program implementation and operation to enhance consistency in 
program performance and management. The report also found disparities in the inspector 
resources available per mine on a district basis. Factors that should be considered in allocating 
inspector resources include mine size, geographic clustering, and travel time. The report also 
discovered that the mix of activities between enforcement and compliance assistance fluctuated 
among the districts and within a district from year to year. There was no consensus among 
district managers about the relative effectiveness of enforcement activities and compliance-
oriented activities. All of the district managers believed both types of activities had merit but the 
difficulty was allocating time between activities (U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety and 
Health Administration 2001). 
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Appendix C: Specific Abatement Regressions* 
∆totinjt  = 0.32∆totinjt-1 + 0.12∆totinjt-2 + 0.02∆totinjt-3 – 0.01∆totinjt-4 
   + 0.56∆lhourt – 0.23∆lhourt-1 – 0.04∆lhourt-2 – 0.02∆lhourt-3 – 0.01∆lhourt-4 
   + 0.26∆posnmt – 0.13∆posnmt-1 – 0.08∆posnmt-2 – 0.04∆posnmt-3 – 0.04∆posnmt-4 
   – 0.25∆sumwot + 0.08∆sumwot-1 – 0.02∆sumwot-2 – 0.05∆sumwot-3 – 0.09∆sumwot-4 
   + γ1 time dummies + γ2 location dummies.         (C.1) 
ηposnum = −0.043 , ηsumwo = −0.041 
P(no 1st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(no 2nd order serial correlation) = 0.17 
∆totinjt  = 0.32∆totinjt-1 + 0.12∆totinjt-2 + 0.02∆totinjt-3 – 0.01∆totinjt-4 
   + 0.52∆lhourt – 0.22∆lhourt-1 – 0.04∆lhourt-2 – 0.03∆lhourt-3 – 0.01∆lhourt-4 
   + 0.29∆posnmt – 0.13∆posnmt-1 – 0.07∆posnmt-2 – 0.03∆posnmt-3 – 0.03∆posnmt-4 
   – 0.26∆sumwot + 0.12∆sumwot-1 + 0.01∆sumwot-2 – 0.02∆sumwot-3 – 0.07∆sumwot-4 
   – 0.03∆lindamt – 0.03∆lindamt-1 – 0.03∆lindamt-2 + 0.03∆lindamt-3 – 0.0004∆lindmt-4  
   – 0.16∆penumt – 0.11∆penumt-1 – 0.14∆penumt-2 – 0.0003∆penumt-3 – 0.10∆penumt-4 
   – 0.02∆wonumt – 0.68∆wonumt-1 + 0.09∆wonumt-2 + 0.27∆wonumt-3 – 0.52∆wonumt-4 
   + γ1 time dummies + γ2 location dummies.         (C.2)  
   ηposnum = 0.048 , ηsumwo = −0.027, ηlindam = −0.058, ηpenum =  −0.76, ηwonum = −0.10. 
   P(no 1st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(no 2nd order serial correlation) = 0.17 
*underline indicates that the coefficient was 1.68 times its (robust) standard error
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1. For an examination of the effect of pre-MSHA state mining laws see Fishback (1992) and 
Boal (2003). 
 
2. Higher fines for safety violations might also improve safety; however, in the empirical 
work described later, we find no evidence that average fines reduce lost workday injuries. 
 
3. Although we prefer the safety production function characterization (Viscusi 1992) as a 
way of thinking about the regression specifications to follow, the model is 
econometrically indistinguishable from the behavioral regulation approach (Scholtz and 
Gray 1990) and the optimizing social regulator approach (Auld et al. 2001). 
 
4. When estimating Equation (3.2) we allow for distributed lags in IR and m and treat both 
as endogenous. 
 
5. A strictly exogenous variable, xit, satisfies E[xitεis] = 0 for all t and s. A predetermined 
variable can have E[witεis] ≠ 0 for s > t but E[witεis] = 0 for all s ≤ t. Put simply, if the 
error term at time t has some feedback on later realizations of w, then w is a 
predetermined variable. The idea is that unforecastable errors today might affect future 
changes in w. 
 
6. We estimate our dynamic panel regressions using XTABOND from STATA, Release 7.0. 
The model rests on no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; the 
XTABOND routine produces so-called robust (to heteroskedasticity) standard errors, 
incorporates the needed tests for autocorrelation as well as the Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan test is poorly sized, however, and difficult to 
pass when the instrument set is relatively large as in our case (Hall and Horowitz 1996, 
Ziliak 1997); it is therefore not surprising that none of the regressions we discuss pass the 
Sargan test. 
 
7. For illustration consider the case where the right-hand side of Equation (4.1) contains 
exogenous variables, one lagged outcome, yt−1, and no predetermined variables, so that 
in the estimated differenced form the regressors become ∆xt and ∆yt−1. At t = 3, y1 is a 
valid instrument, at t = 4, y1 and y2 are valid instruments, which adds another column to 
the instrument matrix Z, and so on, which are in addition to the columns for each x. More 
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generally, if p is the number of lagged y’s in the model, i is the number of cross-section 
units, and T is the total number of time periods, then the number of columns in Z is 2T ii p−∑ = . 
Predetermined variables are like lagged y’s in terms of adding columns to the instrument 
matrix. In our estimation we work with 1 to 8 lags of y, 1 to 3 predetermined variables, 1 
to 206 x’s, with the maximum T = 55 and i = 3450, so that our models are often 
constrained by the maximum feasible width of Z in STATA.  
 
8. Simple and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Greene 2003, Chapter 20) reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in totinjt, our focal dependent variable. 
 
9. Because MSHA does not list contractor production, employment, and injury data 
separately for each mine, we exclude outside contractors from our research. 
 
10. We define a mine as operating in a quarter if it employed at least one hour of labor. 
 
11. In many cases, the monetary penalty for a violation resulting in a withdrawal order is 
added to a previous citation. 
 
12. All penalties (monetary and withdrawal orders) are for violations of standards deemed 
serious  or substantial where the likelihood of an injury occurring is viewed to be likely, 
highly likely, or has already occurred. 
 
13. Remember that the 5 percent nominal significance level for a one-sided hypothesis test is 
only a heuristic because of the large amount of data mining behind the regression result. 
A useful approximate result described in Lovell (1983) for the connection between the 
true and claimed levels of significance is that α(claimed) = (k/c) × α(true), where a 
search has been conducted for the best k out of c candidate explanatory variables’ 
coefficients. 
 
14. To try to enlarge the estimated effect of MSHA we have also estimated the statistically 
most biased dynamic panel regression models, which are OLS, IV fixed effects and IV 
first-differences (Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 2000; Bond 2002). In the IV fixed 
effects results no general deterrence coefficient was at least 1.68 times its standard error, 
and the results from IV first differences did not satisfy the basic stability condition that 
jj α∑  < 1 . OLS results yield no coefficient for either lindam or penum that is both 
negative and at least 1.68 times its standard error and ˆwonumη = −0.19. Finally, the estimated 
effects of MSHA are positive when we smooth our quarterly data by annualizing it. 
 
15. For the mines in our estimation sample we have data on 499,940 serious violations of 
MSHA standards (hazards likely to result in injury). Of the almost half million violations, 
94 percent were discovered during  general and safety-related inspections where over 99 
percent of the citations were for safety hazards. 
 
16. Attempts to find subtle threshold effects of the type depicted in Figure 1 were mostly 
unsuccessful, so our calculations use a constant value for the impact of MSHA. The cubic 
in MSHA that will capture the non-linearity of threshold effects also produces 
collinearity among m, m2, and m3 that necessitates the use of orthogonal polynomials 
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regression. In the orthogonal polynomials regressions paralleling Equation (6.1), the only 
polynomials with a coefficient whose value exceeded 1.0 were for ∆wonumt−3 and 
∆wonumt−4, and in both cases the coefficients (of ∆wonum2(t−3) and ∆wonum(t−4)) 
were negative, which is contrary to the possible ineffectiveness of MSHA at relatively 
high or low levels of enforcement depicted in Figure 1. On the other hand we also 
estimated simple dynamic censored (ZINB, Tobit, and Heckit) regression models that 
take explicit account of the fact that about 50 percent of the observations on the 
dependent variable are zero. The results show that MSHA has no effect at the extensive 
margin and all of its effect is at the intensive margin, which implies that at low levels of 
injury, MSHA is ineffective at reducing injuries (to zero). For econometric background 
on sophisticated censored dynamic panel models see Hu (2002). 
  
17. MSHA supplied inspection data for underground, surface, and mills – including 
mandatory inspections and investigations, enforcement activities not on mine property, 
and education and training evaluations. 
 
18. Tengs et al. (1995) only consider reducing mortality risks. Based on our calculations the 
marginal cost of reducing one fatality is at least $375,471,940 in 2002 dollars. Dividing 
by 17.3 (the number of discounted life years), the cost per life year saved by reducing 
only mortality risk is then about $21,703,580. 
 
19. A short list includes installing car windshields with adhesive bonding instead of rubber 
gaskets, laws requiring smoke detectors in homes, mandatory motorcycle helmet laws, 
banning residential growth in tsunami-prone areas, banning sale of three-wheel ATVs, 
rubella vaccinations for children age two, and smoking cessation advice for pregnant 
women who smoke. For the interested reader, we note that the most expensive programs 
per life year gained ($2002) include sickle cell screening for non-black low risk 
newborns ($42 billion) and applying chloroform limits on private wells to emissions at 
the 48 worst case pulp mills ($123 billion). 
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Table 1. MSHA Enforcement Activities, All Active Underground Coal Mines, 1983-1997 
 
  Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum  
     Deviation 
 
A. Citations (Observations = 971,117) 
Initial fine ($2002)  $184 $115 $526 $18 $66,043  
Reduction of fine from initial level 13.7% 0% 35.0% −3493% 100%  
Serious violation  60.4%      
High degree of operator negligence 2.4%1      
 
B. Withdrawal Orders (Observations = 37,205) 
Initial fine ($2002)2  $2,079 $1,214 $4,132 $26 $68,822   
Penalty reduction  39.0% 0% 46.4% −665% 100% 
Serious violation  56.9%      
High degree of operator negligence3 88.4%3      
Days from issuance to termination  32.2 1 167.2 0 4,656 
 
C. Safety-Related Inspections (Observations = 371,684) 
Monetary penalty imposed  40.2%      
Total initial fine ($2002 for all $1,503 $320 $6,911 $26 $713,260 
violations found 5 
Reduction of fine from initial level 13.9% 0% 34.9% −2400% 100% 
Withdrawal order issued  4.6% 
Serious violation discovered6 30.6%      
High degree of operator negligence 4.9%      
Withdrawal order issued  2.4%      
for serious violation 
 
D. Safety Enforcement Activities per Mine per Quarter (Observations = 80,592) 
Number of inspections   4.612 3 4.999 0 78  
Number of inspections with  1.855 1 2.132 0 30  
monetary penalties 
Average initial fine per  $1,263 $431 $4,409 $26 $373,169  
inspection with fine ($2002)7  
Reduction of fine from initial level7 16.2% 0 35.4% −1250% 100%  
Number of inspections with a  0.211 0 0.581 0 16  
withdrawal order 
Number of inspections with a 1.410 1 1.821 0 25  
Serious violation 
Number of inspections with a  0.184 0 0.534 0 13  
high degree of operator  
negligence violation 
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Table 1 (cont.). MSHA Enforcement Activities, All Active Underground Coal Mines, 1983-1997 
 
  Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum  
     Deviation 
 
E. Safety Enforcement Activities Per Mine per Quarter, Excluding Nonserious Violations  
(Observations = 80,592) 
Number of inspections with a  1.409 1 1.820 0 25  
Monetary penalty 
Number of inspections with a   0.108 0 0.429 0 11  
withdrawal order 
Average initial fine per   $1,442 $515 $4,664 $26 $378,847  
inspection with fine  ($2002)8 
Reduction of fine from initial level 17.2% 0 36.0% −806% 100% 
Numbers of inspections with a 0.184 0 0.534 0 13  
high degree of operator  
negligence violation 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
1 Excludes the 13,545 citations failing to report the degree of operator negligence.    
2 Statistics are calculated for the 22,000 withdrawal orders with an attached monetary penalty.   
3 Excludes the 14,083 withdrawal orders failing to report the degree of operator negligence. 
4 Excludes the 501 withdrawal orders lacking termination dates. 
5 Statistics are calculated for the 149,519 inspections imposing a monetary penalty. 
6 Monetary penalties were assessed on all inspections discovering a serious violation. 
7 We calculate the average by first totaling all monetary penalties for a given inspection.  Then for each mine in each 
quarter, we average the penalty per inspection across all inspections with penalties.  Statistics are generated for the 
67,594 nonzero observations. 
8 Averages are determined as described in footnote 7 excluding all nonserious violations.  Statistics are generated for 
the 57,517 nonzero observations. 
  
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Description 
       
Dependent Variable       
Injuries (totinj) 1.884 0 4.124 0 97 Number of lost-workday injuries including 
fatalities 
       
General Deterrence       
Average fine ($2002)  $1,706 $1,378 $1,261 $82 $24,707 Enforcement district average monetary penalty 
per inspection with monetary penalty 
Log average fine (lindamt) 7.222 7.229 0.675 4.411 10.115 Natural logarithm of average fine 
District inspections with fines 
(pennum) 
1.536 1.313 0.789 0 6.833 Enforcement district inspections with 
monetary penalties per mine 
District inspections with 
withdrawal orders (wonum) 
0.122 0.076 0.149 0 2.357 Enforcement district inspections with 
withdrawal orders per mine 
       
Specific Abatement       
Inspections with fines (posnum) 1.633 1 2.076 0 25 Number of inspections with monetary 
penalties 
Inspections with withdrawal 
orders (sumwo) 
0.128 0 0.473 0 11 Number of inspections with withdrawal orders 
       
Mine Size       
Hours 36,927 12,965 61,514 1 875,668 Total employee hours worked 
Log hours (lhour) 9.474 9.470 1.585 0 13.683 Natural logarithm of hours 
Notes: Sample Size = 48,932 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1. Threshold Effects in MSHA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Annual Fatalities Per Million Employee Hours 
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1931–1997 
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Figure 3. Annual Nonfatal Disabling Injuries Per Million Employee Hours  
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1931–1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Quarterly Injuries Per Million Employee Hours in Estimation Sample 
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1983:1–1997:4 
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